Category Archives: Medieval France

Henry’s Howlers (2) Diplomatic Disasters: Mayhem in Maine and Nonsense in Normandy: 1440-1450.

(1) Introduction

Just over 70 years ago next week, on 12th March 1942, General MacArthur, Commander of the US Armed Forces in the Pacific, was compelled to quit the Philippines in the face of the invading Japanese Armies. Arriving in South Australia a week later, General MacArthur declared: “I came through and I shall return.” General MacArthur fulfilled his pledge. Together with the US Armed Forces, MacArthur returned to the Philippines in October 1944. To crown his military achievement, MacArthur personally accepted the surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces in August 1945.

Going back in time over 700 years from 1945, King John was compelled to quit his territory of Normandy, in December 1203. King John’s inglorious departure from Normandy was mainly the result of the advance of French Armed Forces, led by King Philip II. John did try to return to Normandy ten years later; but in contrast to General MacArthur, King John’s attempted comeback ended in disaster at the battle of Bouvines. Normandy had been a vital component of the Anglo-Norman Régime for 150 years (1066 to 1214); reaching its height under Henry I and Henry II. After Bouvines (1214) the province passed under French control, where it was to remain for the next 200 years.

(2) Lancastrian Expansion in France 1415 to 1425

If the English did not return to Normandy under King John, they certainly did under the Lancastrian Monarch, King Henry V. In August 1415, King Henry V and his Anglo/Welsh Army invaded Normandy, winning a stunning victory over the French Armies two months later at the Battle of Agincourt. The seal was set on Henry V’s success by the Treaty of Troyes, in 1420. By this Treaty, King Henry V married Catherine of Valois (daughter of King Charles VI of France). By this Treaty, Henry’s heirs would be recognised as Kings of France. King Henry V was to die in August 1422; but by then he had an heir, as his son King Henry VI had been born in December 1421. Young King Henry was recognised as King of France, most notably in Normandy. English control in Normandy was further consolidated in August 1424 with the great English victory over the French Armies at the Battle of Verneuil (in eastern Normandy).

(3) Resurgence of the French Forces in France  1425 to1440.

England in the first half of the 15th Century was affected by economic recession and was also plagued (literally) by a falling population. John Hatcher and Mark Bailey estimate the population of England in the mid-fifteenth century at somewhere between 2.25 and 2.5 million, far below the peak of 6 million around 1300. [‘Modelling the Middle Ages’ (2001), pp29 and 31]. It was these economic and social constraints, rather than the intrepid determination of Jeanne d’Arc that meant that the English Armies could never hope to retain control of half of France.

The result was that the English Armies gradually gave ground in parts of France. In 1429, English Forces withdrew from Orléans (thereby ceding control in Central France). Six years later in 1435, the English military presence in France received a major setback. In the summer of 1435, by the Treaty of Arras, England’s ally, Burgundy defected to the French Forces. Just as bad, the Commander of the English Armies in France, the Duke of Bedford, died at the early age of 46, in September 1435.  The Duke of Bedford (brother of Henry V) had been the victor at Verneuil, so his loss was keenly felt. It was therefore no surprise that the English Armies lost Paris in 1436, following this military ‘double whammy’.

(4) Defence of Normandy 1440 to 1446

The retention of Normandy was perhaps the crucial factor in maintaining Lancastrian prestige. When Henry VI formally assumed royal powers in 1437, despite the fall of Paris the year before, there were still solid grounds for optimism about the English position in Normandy:-

  • The two stunning English victories of Agincourt (1415) and Verneuil (1424) had both occurred in Normandy, reinforcing English prestige in that province.
  • Groups of English soldiers had settled in Normandy, marrying local girls, and working farms. In 1432 (a few years before Henry VI’s assumption of power) a university was founded in Caen for the education of these settlers. It seemed as if an English community was taking root in Normandy, alongside the native Normans. There was of course some Norman resistance to this English immigration (even a riot in 1436); but overall, one feels that a genuine Anglo/Norman ‘multi-cultural’ society was developing in Normandy in these years.
  • By 1440, there were substantial garrisons in 45 towns in Normandy, with impressive fortifications for the major cities of Rouen, Caen and Alençon.
  • Between 1440 and 1446, Richard, Duke of York was the English Commander in Normandy. He generally followed a defensive military strategy; husbanding his resources, and avoiding major conflicts with the French, whilst at the same time trying to maintain English strength in Normandy. This sensible strategy helped maintain English authority in Normandy, though it was under pressure because of Henry VI’s blunders (see below).

Lancastrian Blunders in Normandy: 1443

In 1443, without even informing Richard of York, Henry VI authorised John Beaufort, newly created 1st Duke of Somerset, to lead an English military expedition to western Normandy and the Loire region. The Army earmarked for this ill-fated enterprise was a force of 4,250 soldiers (which Richard of York could have utilised).

Arriving in Cherbourg in August 1443, Somerset’s Army moved down the western border of Normandy, taking La Guerche, on the Normandy/Brittany border (a meaningless exercise). Even worse, for reasons that are still not entirely understood, Somerset then disbanded his force and simply returned to England (where he soon died). The whole enterprise had been farcical, and merely served to leave Richard of York disenchanted with Lancastrian Government.

(5) Defeat and Disaster in Normandy: 1446 to 1450.

Within four years, English authority in Normandy collapsed:-

  • In December 1446, Richard Duke of York’s command in Normandy was ended by King Henry VI. Richard himself made no protest, though significantly, his captains in Normandy did. Richard of York was replaced as English Lieutenant in Normandy by one Edmund Beaufort, 2nd Duke of Somerset (brother of John Beaufort). Somerset’s appointment was a mistake. He seemed to follow his elder brother John in his military ineptitude. Edmund Beaufort dragged his feet in Normandy, though to be fair to him, by the time Somerset took up his commission in Normandy, irreparable damage had already been done to English control in Normandy by the disastrous English cession of Maine.
  • It is a truism of medieval government that the possession of the province of Maine was essential to English authority in Normandy. The reason is that Maine is adjacent to Normandy’s southern border. Maine therefore acted as a ‘Buffer Zone’, protecting southern Normandy from invasion. As Normandy’s northern frontier was the English Channel, this meant that Normandy’s defenders could concentrate on strengthening their western and, above all, their eastern, borders, against outside attack. This obvious military equation was understood by all medieval rulers. In 1096, King William II wanted to regain Normandy from his older brother, Duke Robert of Normandy. He therefore ‘leased’ Normandy from Duke Robert for £6,666 (thereby allowing Robert to participate in the 1st Crusade). However, to ensure he kept hold of his newly won Duchy, King William II made sure he took possession of Maine, which he achieved in the winter of 1096/1097. Just over one hundred years later, at the start of the 13th century, King Philip II of France was about to launch his final offensive against the English King John. In particular, Philip wanted to gain Normandy. King Philip of France invaded Normandy in the summer of 1203; but only after he had obtained Maine, in spring 1203.
  • It is therefore difficult to understand precisely why King Henry VI was so determined to surrender Maine to King Charles VII of France in the 1440s. He must have known that such a surrender would gravely threaten English possession of Normandy. Henry’s principal negotiator with Charles VII was the Earl of Suffolk. He, too, must have known the risk he was running when he secretly negotiated with the French as early as 1445. Maine was finally surrendered to the French in 1448, without any reciprocal gesture from the French. It is one of the worst acts of appeasement in British diplomatic history. Military retribution now swiftly followed the loss of Maine. In July 1449, King Charles VII declared war, and sent three armies into Normandy. It was no accident that one of these three invading armies entered Normandy from Maine, capturing several Norman towns, including, symbolically, Verneuil.
  • It was soon all over. A belated attempt was made by Henry VI in 1450 to retrieve something from the wreckage. An English Army under Sir Thomas Kyriell landed at Cherbourg, hoping to relieve the English community under Somerset in Caen. The enterprise was doomed. The French forces intercepted Kyriell’s Army ten miles short of Caen, at Formigny. There, the French Army overwhelmed Kyriell’s force, aided by their expert use of gunpowder artillery. Somerset himself surrendered on 24th June 1450 and was allowed to escape to the English garrison at Calais.

 

(6) To what extent was King Henry VI’s Lancastrian Government  responsible for the loss of Normandy?

Even allowing for the economic and social constraints  of recession and declining population, Henry VI should still take most of the blame for the disastrous loss of Normandy:-

(i) Henry’s decision to divide English military command in 1443 between Richard Duke of York and John Duke of Somerset was clearly a major error.

(ii) Henry’s decision to cede Maine (in conjunction with the Duke of Suffolk) was a blunder.

(7) How did the Lancastrian disaster over Normandy contribute to the later outbreak of the Wars of the Roses?

(i) In general, the devastating loss of Normandy greatly undermined public confidence King Henry VI’s Lancastrian Régime. In the February 1450 Session of Parliament, great concern was expressed by the Commons that ; “If war should occur, which God forbid, the country of Normandy is in no way sufficient in itself to offer resistance against the great might of the enemies.(My italics). [‘The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275-1504’, (2012), page 55.] Parliament was clearly aware of the Lancastrian shortcomings in military planning. One therefore feels that the subsequent collapse of English authority in Normandy might well lead to disenchantment with Henry VI – the first pre-condition to outright opposition.

(ii) Richard Duke of York in particular had genuine grounds for grievance against the Lancastrians. He had defended English authority in Normandy for six years, and yet had been treated shabbily by Henry VI. He had not been informed about the abortive 1443 military enterprise in Normandy, and had been replaced by another Duke of Somerset as English Commander in 1446. One of the key conflicts in the later Wars of the Roses was the bitter vendetta between Richard of York and the Somersets. Perhaps that enmity has its origins in the English defence of Normandy in the 1440s.

(8) Conclusion.

The English monarchy never did return to claim authority in Normandy. To that extent, the loss of Normandy in 1450 was the final demise of the famous Anglo/Norman nation inaugurated by the Norman Conquest of 1066. The great English monarchs, King Henry I and King Henry II, would have been appalled at this fracturing of the Anglo/Norman state. In Shakespeare’s History Play, ‘The Third Part of King Henry VI’, Shakespeare seems to blame Henry for the losses in France.

In Act 1, Scene 1, of this play, Shakespeare has King Henry VI trying to defend his foreign policy before his English Magnates.

King Henry States: “I am the son of Henry the Fifth,

Who made the Dauphin and the French to stoop,

And seized upon their towns and provinces.”

This desperate plea earned a swift retort from the Earl of Warwick:

“Talk not of France, since thou hast lost it all.”

It is hard to disagree with Warwick’s  judgement.

Question

I am deliberately uploading my March’ Wars of the Roses Blog’ on 4th March, 2013. Why is the date, 4th March, so significant in the Wars of the Roses?

 

 

 

 

Advertisements

Leave a comment

Filed under 100 top Britons poll (BBC), 100 Years War, Agincourt, Angevins, British Kings and Queens, Charles VII of France, Civil War, Edward IV, General MacArthur, Henry I, Henry II, Henry VI, Jeanne d'Arc, King John, King William Rufus, King William the Conqueror, Kings of France, Lancastrians, Maine, Medieval battles, Medieval France, Medieval government, Medieval History, Medieval Normandy, Military History, Neviles, Norman Kings, Normandy, Philip II of France, Richard Duke of York, Rouen, Shakespeare, Wars of the Roses, White Rose, Yorkists

Henry’s Howlers: (1) Economic Background to the Wars of the Roses (1437-1450)

(1) Introduction: King Henry VI (1422-1461 and 1470-1471)

On 6th November 1429 in Westminster Abbey, Henry of Windsor (son and heir of King Henry V) was crowned King Henry VI of England.  This royal investiture in London was only the first half of a ‘double coronation’. Two years later, on 2nd December 1431, in Notre Dame Cathedral, Paris, Henry was also crowned King of France. Henry was then only four days short of his tenth birthday. About fourteen years after his French Coronation, on 23rd April 1445, Henry aspired to another Gallic royal triumph when he married Margaret of Anjou. Yet all this youthful promise was to come to nought:-

  • Within thirty years of his Paris coronation, in 1461, Henry VI had lost both his English and French Crowns. The Yorkist Edward Earl of March was crowned King Edward IV of England on 4th March 1461. Almost exactly four months later, on 3rd July 1461, Prince Louis of Valois was crowned King Louis XI of France.
  • Even worse was to follow. Within ten years of his English deposition, on 21st/22nd May 1471, King Henry VI was sadly  done to death in the Tower of London: almost certainly on the orders of King Edward IV. Henry was then about 50 years old.

So how is King Henry VI remembered today?

  • Is it that he is the youngest person ever to have succeeded to the English Crown? (Henry succeeded to the English Crown on 31st August 1422, when he was just nine months old.)
  • Is it that King Henry VI is the only King of England to be recognised as King of both England and France? (31st August 1422)
  • Is it that King Henry VI founded  both Eton College (in 1440) and King’s College, Cambridge (in 1441)?

For me, King Henry VI’s chief claim to fame is that, as Head of the Lancastrian Monarchy in England, he presided over one of the worst governments to rule in medieval England. Furthermore, so ineffective was King Henry VI, that he helped to cause the murderous conflict that was to engulf England in the mid-fifteenth century: The Wars of the Roses!

(2) Economic Recession 1440-1480

(i) Compared with the economic boom that occurred in 12th century England, the economic situation was very bleak in the mid-fifteenth century. Historians now refer to the mid-fifteenth century as ‘The Great Slump’. This economic downturn was especially severe for certain sections of English society:-

a) The Magnates (Great Nobility), who saw their rental income fall.

b) Woollen cloth manufacturers, who experienced a decline in woollen cloth exports.

c) Workers involved in manufacture, who were increasingly under-employed (or unemployed).

As is the case with most recessions, certain sectors of society did quite well, such as agricultural labourers.  John Hatcher and Mark Bailey have suggested that: “By the middle of the fifteenth century the purchasing power of a day’s labour seems to have more than doubled”.

[John Hatcher & Mark Bailey: ‘Modelling the Middle Ages’ (2001), page 48]

Yet overall, the recession was profound.

(ii) King Henry VI’s Lancastrian Government shared in this economic gloom. On 6th November 1449, a new session of Parliament met at the Dominican Friary, Ludgate, London. Immediately, the Commons  petitioned Henry VI on the state of royal finances. The petition is worth quoting in full:

“The Commons assembled in this your present parliament pray you to consider; whereas your chancellor of your realm of England, your treasurer of England, and many other lords of your council, by your high command, showed and declared the state of this your realm to your said commons at your parliament l; last held at Westminster; which was, that you were in debt for £372,000, which is a great and grievous sum.”

[‘The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275-1504, Volume XII’ (2012), page 107]

Worse then followed.  According to the Commons Petition, royal income was only £5,000 a year, while royal expenditure was £24,000 a year. Such financial pressures on governments are not restricted to the mid-fifteenth century: they are also only too apparent in 2013! The point is, such financial problems imposed severe constraints on Henry’s Government, which in turn was a great source of instability in mid-fifteenth century England (as the Commons Petition implied). In addition, financial pressures meant that the Lancastrian Government could not properly defend Normandy against the encroaching French Forces (see my forthcoming February Blog). The question is: How far were Henry VI and his ministers responsible for the financial mess in which they found themselves in 1450?

(3) To what extent was King Henry VI’s Lancastrian Government responsible for the Government  Financial Chaos in 1450?

On one level, Henry VI was simply the victim of the ‘Great Slump’. It has been estimated that English woollen cloth exports had collapsed by a third between 1440 and 1450. There had also been a decline in imports of wine in this period. This major contraction of international trade in turn meant a great reduction of crown revenue from customs duties. Royal revenue from the customs duties had been £40,000 in 1421 (towards the end of King Henry V’s reign).  In contrast, King Henry VI could only count on an average annual customs revenue of £28,000 between 1446 to 1448.

However, on another level, there is no doubt that the Lancastrian Government  made things worse for themselves, and Henry VI himself  should shoulder a lot of the responsibility:-

  • There is some evidence that Henry VI’s Government had got itself into a trade war with Burgundy (an independent Duchy in North Western Europe). This had led to Burgundy banning the import of English woollen cloth into Burgundy. Apparently, Henry’s Government had been feeble in its response to this prohibition. The Commons Petition in the Parliament that met at Westminster (February 1449) expressly complained that: “As yet no redress has been made, to the most intolerable harm of all the commons of this realm. . . many cloth makers, that is to say male weavers, fullers and dyers. And female combers, carders and spinners.” [‘The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275-1504, Volume XII’ (2012), page 60].
  • King Henry VI was excessively generous in making grants to supporters and for ‘good causes’. Right at the beginning of his rule, in 1438, one of Henry’s council clerks (in modern language, a top civil servant) had complained that Henry had pardoned a collector of customs, thereby losing the Crown £1,300. Exactly ten years later, in 1448, Henry VI expressly willed the huge yearly sum of £1,000 to go towards the building costs of King’s College, Cambridge. He even earmarked part of his own Duchy of Lancaster income to pay the £1,000. Needless to say, the money soon dried up. Such was Henry’s financial profligacy, that by 1450, his Government was reduced to mortgaging its future income to meet its current debts. The proceedings of the February 1449 Parliament also record a grant of 2,500 marks (about £1,700) to the Duke of Somerset and £1,000 to the Duke of Suffolk. [‘The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England Volume XII’, page 68] Both of these payments were to be paid from taxation revenue due to Henry VI’s Government in 1450.

(4) How did Economic Pressures contribute to the Outbreak of the Wars of the Roses?

One of the greatest 19th century philosophers of History, Karl Marx, pointed out the link between economic factors and political events. There is clearly some link between economic pressure and later political conflict. For example, no student of 20th century conflict would surely deny the links (direct or indirect) between the Wall Street Crash in the USA in 1929 and the later international conflicts in Manchuria (1931) and Abyssinia (1935).

Similarly, the ‘Great Slump’ of 1440 to 1480 was the clear backdrop to the murderous conflict between the Lancastrian and Yorkist Forces in England between 1455 and 1465.                                                                                              (i) Pressure on their rental incomes made the Magnates more disposed to use violence to protect their living standards. For example, a Lancastrian Force of 700 soldiers, led by Lord Egremont (son of the Earl of Northumberland) attacked a group of Yorkists at Heworth, outside York, in August 1453. This ‘battle’ was in effect the start of the Wars of the Roses; yet the real cause of the Lancastrian aggression was the fact that one member of the Yorkist group had  inherited two valuable manors (one in Yorkshire, one in Lincolnshire). Both these manors had originally belonged to the powerful Earls of Northumberland. This powerful Lancastrian family evidently wanted to regain these manors, probably to compensate for their declining rental income. (See my forthcoming April Blog for details).

(ii) The total Lancastrian mismanagement of the national finances was itself politically de-stabilising. It caused uncertainty and concern amongst the general population. Such concern could easily erupt into popular unrest, as actually happened in the summer of 1450 with the major civil strife in London known as Cade’s Rebellion. One of the complaints of the rioters in Cade’s Rebellion was that: “The King himself is so beset that he may not pay for his meat and drink, and he owes more than ever any King of England ought.” [‘English Historical Documents, Volume IV’, edited by A.R. Myers, page 267]

Nor could public opinion in 1450 fail to notice that the magnates who financially benefitted at a time of national stringency were the Dukes of Somerset and Suffolk. Both these Magnates were very close to King Henry.     Both these Lancastrian magnates were generally unpopular in 1450. The Duke of Suffolk was especially hated. According to the rioters in Cade’s Rebellion, he was: “the false traitor the Duke of Suffolk.” [English Historical Documents. Page 267]. Suffolk was effectively lynched by the mob in 1450. That left the Duke of Somerset to fly the Lancastrian Flag. Perhaps it was no accident that it was personal dislike of Somerset that fuelled the Duke of York’s opposition to the Lancastrian Government which was to be one of the bases of the Wars of the Roses a few years later.

(5) Conclusion

In his play King Henry VI, Part II (Act V, Scene I), Shakespeare has Richard Duke of York address Henry in the following way:-

“King did I call thee? No, thou art not a king,

Nor fit to govern and rule multitudes.”

Is York’s mocking speech justified?  Read the next exciting episode (February 2013) of my new ‘Wars of the Roses’ Blog, entitled: “Henry’s Howlers (2), ’Nonsense in Normandy and Mayhem in Maine.’

Question

King Henry VI is one of four medieval kings of England who were murdered after losing their throne. Who were the other three?

Leave a comment

Filed under 100 Years War, British Kings and Queens, British taxation, Cade's Rebellion, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Civil War, Edward IV, Finance, Henry VI, Historical philosophy, History, Karl Marx, Karl Marz, Kings of France, Lancastrians, Margaret of Anou, Medieval France, Medieval government, Medieval History, Paa, Parliament, Red Rose, Richard Duke of York, Shakespeare, the Percies of Northumberland, Wars of the Roses, White Rose, Yorkists

Sibling Strife Part 3: Henrican Heroism and Anglo-Saxon Atonement: 1106

The final part of my Trilogy on Henry I’s rivalry with his two brothers, King William II of England and Duke Robert of Normandy, in the period 1100 to 1106, is centred on the Battle of Tinchebrai. This important battle fought in Normandy just over 900 years ago today, on 28th September 1106. It was a turning-point in Henry I’s reign (and indeed for the whole of Angevin England). Not only did the battle of Tinchebrai finally consolidate Henry I’s monarchy (he was to reign a further 29 years); but it also partially represented Anglo-Saxon recompense for their military humbling at the Battle of Hastings, forty years previously.

Background to Tinchebrai 1100 to 1103

(1) As my July and August Blogs have hopefully demonstrated, Henry made strenuous efforts to consolidate his régime in England after his spectacular monarchical coup d’état in early August 1100. He issued a ground-breaking manifesto, The Coronation Charter, to win support in England. Three months after the Coronation Charter, Henry made a judicious marriage with Princess Edith Matilda. Henry also managed to out-manoeuvre Duke Robert in the summer of 1101, when the latter invaded England with an army. Henry’s offer of £2,500 to Robert to persuade him to quit England brought Henry a much needed breathing space to consolidate his new régime.

(2) Henry used this breathing space to good effect. His wife, Queen Edith Matilda, bore him two children between 1101 and 1106: Matilda (probably born in February 1102) and William (born on 5th August 1103 exactly three years after the proclamation of the Coronation Charter). The birth of William The Atheling was especially important for the dynastic solidity of Henry’s régime, as it meant he had a son and heir, further enhancing his status among the Anglo-Norman magnates, and possibly also the Anglo-Saxon population.

Scheming for Normandy, 1103 to mid 1106

(a) Despite the undeniable progress Henry had made after 1100, the prize of Normandy still eluded him. Control of Normandy was the essential component in stabilising Henry’s regime in England. Re-unification of England and Normandy would greatly augment Henry’s status in England. Not only would Henry be able to claim that he had re-created the Anglo-Norman state established by his father, William the Conqueror; but Anglo-Norman magnates owning territories on both sides of The Channel would be re-assured that they would not owe allegiance to two different rulers.

(b) Between 1103 and 1106 Henry initiated a ‘Cold War’ against his brother Duke Robert. This ‘Cold War’ strategy took two main forms. To begin with, Henry launched a diplomatic offensive in France against Robert. Henry made agreements with the counts of Anjou, Maine, Brittany and Flanders. Such agreements were accompanied with proposals of marriage alliances, or monetary bribes (or perhaps both).  Secondly, Henry actually ‘invaded’ Northern France, deliberately challenging Duke Robert. The ostensible reason for Henry’s foray into France in August 1104 was for Henry to visit his castle at Domfront, in Normandy. The fact that Henry’s visit was enthusiastically received by Anglo-Norman magnates such as Robert of Meulan, Richard Earl of Chester, Stephen Count of Aumerle and others, was a clear challenge to Robert’s ducal authority in Normandy. Henry made another raid into Northern France in the early summer of 1106 (where he was joined by the Counts of Brittany and Maine). This raid was, in fact, the prelude to Henry’s major invasion of Normandy, in September 1106.

The Battle of Tinchebrai, 28th September 1106.

Some years ago, Professor Carpenter famously remarked that Henry I “had that rarest of all assets among the successful: he knew when to stop.” [David Carpenter,’ The Struggle for Mastery’. Allen Lane (2003). Pages 134-135].  It could also be argued that Henry also knew when to start. He clearly felt that the time was right in the autumn of 1106 for the ‘final showdown’ with his brother, Duke Robert.

Henry’s precise movements between June and September 1106 are quite difficult to follow, but he undoubtedly had brought across the Channel a formidable array of English troops, to reinforce the soldiers of his continental allies. The key battle between the two brothers was to be fought at Tinchebrai in Normandy. This key battle was ultimately caused by Henry’s provocative action in besieging Tinchebrai Castle, which belonged to one of Robert’s few remaining allies, Count William of Mortain. Count William asked for help from Duke Robert, who duly brought up his army and, as King Henry I had hoped, decided to do battle against the forces of King Henry I. Henry’s army was organised in three lines. According to one contemporary account, given by a priest of Fécamp, King Henry’s Army numbered “about forty thousand men.”[EHD, Vol II, page 329].  This total is clearly an exaggeration, though it does seem to be the case that Henry’s army exceeded that of Duke Robert. The battle started at about 9.00 in the morning with a charge from Robert’s army. Henry himself seems to have dismounted and led his force of Englishmen and Normans into the heat of the battle. The crucial stage in the battle was probably when Henry’s mounted Bretons attacked on the flanks, destroying the Duke’s foot soldiers. Witnessing this reverse, Robert de Bellème, one of Duke Robert’s most important allies, fled the field. Duke Robert’s force now effectively disintegrated, and the battle was over in an hour.

Impact of Henry’s victory at the Battle of Tinchebrai

  • Henry’s great military success confirmed his position as monarch. He was now both King of England and Duke of Normandy. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, expressed contemporary respect for Henry in a letter he wrote to Henry a few weeks after Tinchebrai: “To Henry, glorious king of the English and duke of the Normans, Archbishop Anselm sends faithful service with faithful prayers and wishing he may always increase towards greater and better things and never decrease.”  The sibling strife between King Henry I and his brothers King William II and Duke Robert of Normandy was now over, and Henry was the ultimate victor.
  • King Henry I had effectively re-created the Anglo-Norman state, which was to survive for just under a century, until 1204, when King John was defeated by King Philip Augustus of France. Secure as monarch, King Henry was now able to devote his energies to administrative reform in England, which was to bear fruit a decade later with Henry’s Exchequer reforms (See my April 2012 Blog) and the Legal Reforms (to be analysed in my next Blog, on 1st October 2012).
  • For his part, Duke Robert was taken captive by Henry I’s army. He was placed under ‘house arrest’ in Devizes Castle, and later in Cardiff Castle, where he died in 1134 aged 80 years; (Henry I was to die a year later, in 1135, aged 67 years). Fighting alongside Duke Robert at Tinchebrai was Edgar the Atheling. His was a life of ‘near misses’. On the death of King Edward the Confessor, in 1066, Edgar, then fifteen years old, was the natural successor to the English Crown. However, he was passed over in favour of Harold Godwinson. The Anglo-Norman kings treated Edgar well, and Edgar became especially friendly with Robert. In fact, he fought alongside Duke Robert at Tinchebrai. Henry immediately released Edgar, who then lived quietly, dying at the age of 75 in 1126. His epitaph will always be, ‘The king who was proclaimed but never crowned.’
  • Finally, was Tinchebrai a ‘revenge’ victory for the Anglo-Saxons? It is a fact that Tinchebrai was fought exactly forty years after Duke William’s huge invading force had landed on English soil (at Pevensey, on 28th September 1066). This remarkable co-incidence suggests that Henry I may have had some inkling of the historical parallel – he certainly used English troops at Tinchebrai. The reliable contemporary chronicler, William of Malmesbury, had no doubt of the historical co-incidence: “It was the same day, on which about forty years before, William had first landed at Hastings: doubtless by the wise dispensation of God, that Normandy should be subjected to England on the same day that the Normans had formerly arrived to subjugate that kingdom.” Whatever the truth of the matter, it’s a nice story.

Question

Does History merely consist of s series of random, unique events, as Karl Popper argued: or does History sometimes repeat itself?

Leave a comment

Filed under 12th Century England, Angevins, Anglo-Saxon history, Anjou, Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, Battle of Hastings 1066, British Kings and Queens, Chance in History, Duke Robert of Normandy, Edgar the Atheling, Fyrd, Henry I, Historical philosophy, History, Karl Popper, King Harold of England, King William the Conqueror, Medieval battles, Medieval France, Medieval government, Medieval History, Medieval Normandy, Military History, Norman Kings, Normandy, Robert Curthose, William of Malmesbury

A Brace of Battles: Bremule (1119) and Bourgtheroulde (1124)

On your imaginary forces work. It is the 26th March 1124, exactly 888 years ago. The place is the small town of Bourgtheroulde, about ten miles southwest of  Rouen, the key city of Normandy.

A rebel force of about 40 knights, led by Waleran (Count of Meulan) schemed to consolidate their authority at Vatteville (roughly 20 miles due west of Rouen). Their strategy, if successful, would strike a blow against King Henry I’s power in Normandy. Yet, King Henry’s loyal Norman forces had not been idle. Their scouts had located Waleran’s rebel force, and so the Norman  loyalists prepared to intercept the rebels. One of the loyalist leaders was Odo Borleng, Castellan of Bernay (about 20 miles due south of Rouen). In contrast to Waleran, Odo Borleng was “only” a Knight of lesser nobility; but he displayed heroic leadership qualities. His loyalist force contained archers, mounted knights and foot soldiers. Odo himself dismounted and elected to fight on foot, thereby signifying to his forces that whatever the outcome of the impending battle, he would not flee. Odo’s heroic example heartened his men. In contrast, Waleran was too headstrong: he pitched in too early, leading his 40 knights against the loyalist archers. The result was disaster for the rebels. In just over half an hour the rebels were routed. Waleran and most of the other rebel knights were captured. Henry himself was not at the battle, he was then in Caen, where he received news of the defeat of his enemies.

Perhaps the battle at Bourgtheroulde was little more than a glorified skirmish; but its impact was profound. King Henry I had faced a serious threat to his authority from rebel forces between 1123 and 1124. The victory at Bourgtheroulde was decisive: it marked the end of the rebellion, and therefore confirmed Henry’s authority, both in Normandy, and in England.

Let us now press the re-wind Button and travel back five years to 1119

In August 1100, Henry had acceded to the throne of England in peculiar circumstances: his brother, King William II, had died in a hunting accident. Henry’s other brother, Robert, was Duke of Normandy. Henry had the political sagacity to realise that his newly won royal authority in England required him to reunite Normandy and England. He thus focussed all his energy on reuniting England with Normandy, which he achieved with his stunning military success at Tinchebrai in 1106; in the process, capturing Duke Robert. Even so, Henry still faced major challenges to his authority in Normandy. Henry may have eliminated the threat from Duke Robert; but Robert’s only legitimate son, William Clito, born in  1102, became increasingly the pivot of baronial opposition to Henry in Normandy. Even worse, King Louis VI of France, crowned two years after Tinchebrai, was determined to weaken Henry’s authority in Normandy. As Henry’s nominal overlord in France, Louis VI was a continual thorn in Henry’s side after 1108.

The Battle of Bremule, 20th August 1119

The tensions between Henry and Louis finally erupted in 1119, at the Battle of Bremule, fifteen miles south-east of Rouen. Pitched battles were rare in the Middle Ages, mainly because they were too much of a gamble. A monarch could lose everything in a battle (including his life). At stake in Bremeule was the prize of Normandy.

King Louis had assembled a force of 400 knights, including William Clito and William Crispin (whom Henry I had pardoned after Tinchebrai and again in 1113). King Louis’s force also included some important French magnates. In opposition, King Henry had assembled a force of 500 knights, including three of his sons: Richard and Robert (both illegitimate) and Henry’s heir, William the Atheling. Bremeule therefore saw a clash ‘of sons and heirs’. William Clito, son and heir of Duke Robert, had been born in October 1102. He was thus nearly seventeen years old when he fought at Bremeule. Henry’s heir, William the Atheling, sixteen years old when he fought at Bremeule, was therefore only a year younger than William Clito. The two heirs’ close proximity in age, added an undoubted sense of ‘needle’ to the battle.

Once again, the battle did not last very long, perhaps just over an hour. Once again, Henry’s opponents lost the initiative by pitching into Henry’s forces too recklessly, though there was a fierce struggle between both armies before Henry’s force finally won the day. In particular, William Crispin made a direct attack on King Henry I. Crispin struck a blow against Henry’s head (Henry having dismounted). The blow could have been fatal; but luckily for Henry, Crispin’s blow was deflected by his hauberk. Crispin was then immediately hacked to death by Henry’s bodyguard. Bremeule was a triumph for King Henry I. As just described, Henry himself led by example, being in the thick of the battle. Henry’s force also captured 140 French knights. Finally, Bremeule helped to consolidate Henry’s authority in Normandy, symbolised by the investing of William the Atheling with the Duchy of Normandy in 1120.

King Henry’s Treatment of his Captives.

A mark of a successful (and esteemed) medieval monarch was magnanimity towards the monarch’s former enemies. King Henry II certainly displayed such magnanimity towards his former enemies. For example, in 1175, Henry II restored the Earldom of Norfolk to Hugh Bigod, who had rebelled against Henry between 1173 and 1174. This was a particularly lenient gesture by Henry II, as Hugh Bigod was a ‘Serial Rebel’ – he had also rebelled against King Stephen in 1141. For good measure, Hugh Bigod had also rebelled against the Church, having being excommunicated by Archbishop Becket in 1169. In 1177, Henry II also restored the Earls of Leicester and Chester to their estates, both magnates having rebelled against him between 1173 and 1174.

King Henry I evidently bequeathed such monarchical benevolence to his grandson, King Henry II. Almost immediately after becoming king in 1100, Henry I had faced a formidable baronial rebellion led by William Warenne (Earl of Surrey). Henry therefore dispossessed Warenne of the Earldom; but, having asserted his royal authority, Henry then restored Warenne to the Earldom of Surrey two years later, in 1103. Such monarchical leniency had the effect of increasing baronial respect for Henry’s newly established regime. Henry displayed similar indulgence to his former enemies after the Battle of Bremeule. Henry chivalrously returned King Louis’s warhorse to the French King. This was a particularly altruistic act, because warhorses were very highly esteemed in Medieval Europe.

However, King Henry I drew the line at those captives who, having sworn personal loyalty him, then subsequently betrayed their oaths. Three such rebels had fought with Count Waleran at Bourgtheroulde. They were: Geoffrey of Tourville, Odard of Le Pin, and Luke of La Barre. Despite their treachery, King Henry I still showed mercy by not having the first two miscreants executed – though they were blinded. The third mutineer, Luke of La Barre, was different. He had compounded his disloyalty by singing obscene songs about Henry I. Perhaps Luke knew what his fatewould be, so he ended his own life in dramatic fashion, by beating his head against the stone wall of his prison cell, until he fell, dead.

The ultimate Fates of William the Atheling & Wiliam Clito

On one level, the Battle of Bremeule was a sort of Medieval Boxing Championship, with the winner receiving Normandy, rather than a Lonsdale Belt. Seen in this light, King Henry I’s son, William the Atheling, was clearly the victor, as he was invested with the Duchy of Normandy several months after Bremeule, in 1120. Yet in reality, neither of these youthful protagonists emerged victorious  at the Battle of Bremeule.

In November 1120, fairly soon after his investiture, William the Atheling, died tragically in the ‘White Ship’ Disaster. William was then only 17.5 years old (see my previous blog in November 2011). William Clito similarly had an untimely death. He died of a gangrenous wound sustained in battle, in July 1128. He was then 25 years. Neither William the Atheling nor William Clito left any legitimate heirs. Their premature deaths therefore  meant that the direct male line from William the Conqueror was now extinguished. The result was political and military upheaval in England after King Henry I’s death in 1135; but that is another story.

Concluding Comments

(1) As you will probably have gathered, I began this Blog with a quotation from Shakespeare. Which of his plays is the origin of this quotation?

(2) The rebels who were ambushed by Henry’s forces at Bourgtheroulde on 26th March 1124 actually began their incursion against Henry the previous night, 25th March 1124. For much of English History, 25th March was effectively New Year’s Day. When did England (and the rest of Britain) adopt 1st January as New Year’s Day?

(3) The battles of Bourgtheroulde and Bremeule were both located near to Rouen the chief city in Normandy. If the political link between England and Normandy had somehow survived the Middle Ages, then today Rouen would possibly have been as important as Paris. Think about it!

Leave a comment

Filed under Angevins, British Kings and Queens, Henry I, Henry II, History, Kings of France, Louis VI of France, Medieval battles, Medieval France, Medieval History, Medieval Normandy, Military History, Norman Kings, Normandy, Rouen