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Henry’s Howlers (2) Diplomatic Disasters: Mayhem in Maine and Nonsense in Normandy: 1440-1450.

(1) Introduction

Just over 70 years ago next week, on 12th March 1942, General MacArthur, Commander of the US Armed Forces in the Pacific, was compelled to quit the Philippines in the face of the invading Japanese Armies. Arriving in South Australia a week later, General MacArthur declared: “I came through and I shall return.” General MacArthur fulfilled his pledge. Together with the US Armed Forces, MacArthur returned to the Philippines in October 1944. To crown his military achievement, MacArthur personally accepted the surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces in August 1945.

Going back in time over 700 years from 1945, King John was compelled to quit his territory of Normandy, in December 1203. King John’s inglorious departure from Normandy was mainly the result of the advance of French Armed Forces, led by King Philip II. John did try to return to Normandy ten years later; but in contrast to General MacArthur, King John’s attempted comeback ended in disaster at the battle of Bouvines. Normandy had been a vital component of the Anglo-Norman Régime for 150 years (1066 to 1214); reaching its height under Henry I and Henry II. After Bouvines (1214) the province passed under French control, where it was to remain for the next 200 years.

(2) Lancastrian Expansion in France 1415 to 1425

If the English did not return to Normandy under King John, they certainly did under the Lancastrian Monarch, King Henry V. In August 1415, King Henry V and his Anglo/Welsh Army invaded Normandy, winning a stunning victory over the French Armies two months later at the Battle of Agincourt. The seal was set on Henry V’s success by the Treaty of Troyes, in 1420. By this Treaty, King Henry V married Catherine of Valois (daughter of King Charles VI of France). By this Treaty, Henry’s heirs would be recognised as Kings of France. King Henry V was to die in August 1422; but by then he had an heir, as his son King Henry VI had been born in December 1421. Young King Henry was recognised as King of France, most notably in Normandy. English control in Normandy was further consolidated in August 1424 with the great English victory over the French Armies at the Battle of Verneuil (in eastern Normandy).

(3) Resurgence of the French Forces in France  1425 to1440.

England in the first half of the 15th Century was affected by economic recession and was also plagued (literally) by a falling population. John Hatcher and Mark Bailey estimate the population of England in the mid-fifteenth century at somewhere between 2.25 and 2.5 million, far below the peak of 6 million around 1300. [‘Modelling the Middle Ages’ (2001), pp29 and 31]. It was these economic and social constraints, rather than the intrepid determination of Jeanne d’Arc that meant that the English Armies could never hope to retain control of half of France.

The result was that the English Armies gradually gave ground in parts of France. In 1429, English Forces withdrew from Orléans (thereby ceding control in Central France). Six years later in 1435, the English military presence in France received a major setback. In the summer of 1435, by the Treaty of Arras, England’s ally, Burgundy defected to the French Forces. Just as bad, the Commander of the English Armies in France, the Duke of Bedford, died at the early age of 46, in September 1435.  The Duke of Bedford (brother of Henry V) had been the victor at Verneuil, so his loss was keenly felt. It was therefore no surprise that the English Armies lost Paris in 1436, following this military ‘double whammy’.

(4) Defence of Normandy 1440 to 1446

The retention of Normandy was perhaps the crucial factor in maintaining Lancastrian prestige. When Henry VI formally assumed royal powers in 1437, despite the fall of Paris the year before, there were still solid grounds for optimism about the English position in Normandy:-

  • The two stunning English victories of Agincourt (1415) and Verneuil (1424) had both occurred in Normandy, reinforcing English prestige in that province.
  • Groups of English soldiers had settled in Normandy, marrying local girls, and working farms. In 1432 (a few years before Henry VI’s assumption of power) a university was founded in Caen for the education of these settlers. It seemed as if an English community was taking root in Normandy, alongside the native Normans. There was of course some Norman resistance to this English immigration (even a riot in 1436); but overall, one feels that a genuine Anglo/Norman ‘multi-cultural’ society was developing in Normandy in these years.
  • By 1440, there were substantial garrisons in 45 towns in Normandy, with impressive fortifications for the major cities of Rouen, Caen and Alençon.
  • Between 1440 and 1446, Richard, Duke of York was the English Commander in Normandy. He generally followed a defensive military strategy; husbanding his resources, and avoiding major conflicts with the French, whilst at the same time trying to maintain English strength in Normandy. This sensible strategy helped maintain English authority in Normandy, though it was under pressure because of Henry VI’s blunders (see below).

Lancastrian Blunders in Normandy: 1443

In 1443, without even informing Richard of York, Henry VI authorised John Beaufort, newly created 1st Duke of Somerset, to lead an English military expedition to western Normandy and the Loire region. The Army earmarked for this ill-fated enterprise was a force of 4,250 soldiers (which Richard of York could have utilised).

Arriving in Cherbourg in August 1443, Somerset’s Army moved down the western border of Normandy, taking La Guerche, on the Normandy/Brittany border (a meaningless exercise). Even worse, for reasons that are still not entirely understood, Somerset then disbanded his force and simply returned to England (where he soon died). The whole enterprise had been farcical, and merely served to leave Richard of York disenchanted with Lancastrian Government.

(5) Defeat and Disaster in Normandy: 1446 to 1450.

Within four years, English authority in Normandy collapsed:-

  • In December 1446, Richard Duke of York’s command in Normandy was ended by King Henry VI. Richard himself made no protest, though significantly, his captains in Normandy did. Richard of York was replaced as English Lieutenant in Normandy by one Edmund Beaufort, 2nd Duke of Somerset (brother of John Beaufort). Somerset’s appointment was a mistake. He seemed to follow his elder brother John in his military ineptitude. Edmund Beaufort dragged his feet in Normandy, though to be fair to him, by the time Somerset took up his commission in Normandy, irreparable damage had already been done to English control in Normandy by the disastrous English cession of Maine.
  • It is a truism of medieval government that the possession of the province of Maine was essential to English authority in Normandy. The reason is that Maine is adjacent to Normandy’s southern border. Maine therefore acted as a ‘Buffer Zone’, protecting southern Normandy from invasion. As Normandy’s northern frontier was the English Channel, this meant that Normandy’s defenders could concentrate on strengthening their western and, above all, their eastern, borders, against outside attack. This obvious military equation was understood by all medieval rulers. In 1096, King William II wanted to regain Normandy from his older brother, Duke Robert of Normandy. He therefore ‘leased’ Normandy from Duke Robert for £6,666 (thereby allowing Robert to participate in the 1st Crusade). However, to ensure he kept hold of his newly won Duchy, King William II made sure he took possession of Maine, which he achieved in the winter of 1096/1097. Just over one hundred years later, at the start of the 13th century, King Philip II of France was about to launch his final offensive against the English King John. In particular, Philip wanted to gain Normandy. King Philip of France invaded Normandy in the summer of 1203; but only after he had obtained Maine, in spring 1203.
  • It is therefore difficult to understand precisely why King Henry VI was so determined to surrender Maine to King Charles VII of France in the 1440s. He must have known that such a surrender would gravely threaten English possession of Normandy. Henry’s principal negotiator with Charles VII was the Earl of Suffolk. He, too, must have known the risk he was running when he secretly negotiated with the French as early as 1445. Maine was finally surrendered to the French in 1448, without any reciprocal gesture from the French. It is one of the worst acts of appeasement in British diplomatic history. Military retribution now swiftly followed the loss of Maine. In July 1449, King Charles VII declared war, and sent three armies into Normandy. It was no accident that one of these three invading armies entered Normandy from Maine, capturing several Norman towns, including, symbolically, Verneuil.
  • It was soon all over. A belated attempt was made by Henry VI in 1450 to retrieve something from the wreckage. An English Army under Sir Thomas Kyriell landed at Cherbourg, hoping to relieve the English community under Somerset in Caen. The enterprise was doomed. The French forces intercepted Kyriell’s Army ten miles short of Caen, at Formigny. There, the French Army overwhelmed Kyriell’s force, aided by their expert use of gunpowder artillery. Somerset himself surrendered on 24th June 1450 and was allowed to escape to the English garrison at Calais.

 

(6) To what extent was King Henry VI’s Lancastrian Government  responsible for the loss of Normandy?

Even allowing for the economic and social constraints  of recession and declining population, Henry VI should still take most of the blame for the disastrous loss of Normandy:-

(i) Henry’s decision to divide English military command in 1443 between Richard Duke of York and John Duke of Somerset was clearly a major error.

(ii) Henry’s decision to cede Maine (in conjunction with the Duke of Suffolk) was a blunder.

(7) How did the Lancastrian disaster over Normandy contribute to the later outbreak of the Wars of the Roses?

(i) In general, the devastating loss of Normandy greatly undermined public confidence King Henry VI’s Lancastrian Régime. In the February 1450 Session of Parliament, great concern was expressed by the Commons that ; “If war should occur, which God forbid, the country of Normandy is in no way sufficient in itself to offer resistance against the great might of the enemies.(My italics). [‘The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275-1504’, (2012), page 55.] Parliament was clearly aware of the Lancastrian shortcomings in military planning. One therefore feels that the subsequent collapse of English authority in Normandy might well lead to disenchantment with Henry VI – the first pre-condition to outright opposition.

(ii) Richard Duke of York in particular had genuine grounds for grievance against the Lancastrians. He had defended English authority in Normandy for six years, and yet had been treated shabbily by Henry VI. He had not been informed about the abortive 1443 military enterprise in Normandy, and had been replaced by another Duke of Somerset as English Commander in 1446. One of the key conflicts in the later Wars of the Roses was the bitter vendetta between Richard of York and the Somersets. Perhaps that enmity has its origins in the English defence of Normandy in the 1440s.

(8) Conclusion.

The English monarchy never did return to claim authority in Normandy. To that extent, the loss of Normandy in 1450 was the final demise of the famous Anglo/Norman nation inaugurated by the Norman Conquest of 1066. The great English monarchs, King Henry I and King Henry II, would have been appalled at this fracturing of the Anglo/Norman state. In Shakespeare’s History Play, ‘The Third Part of King Henry VI’, Shakespeare seems to blame Henry for the losses in France.

In Act 1, Scene 1, of this play, Shakespeare has King Henry VI trying to defend his foreign policy before his English Magnates.

King Henry States: “I am the son of Henry the Fifth,

Who made the Dauphin and the French to stoop,

And seized upon their towns and provinces.”

This desperate plea earned a swift retort from the Earl of Warwick:

“Talk not of France, since thou hast lost it all.”

It is hard to disagree with Warwick’s  judgement.

Question

I am deliberately uploading my March’ Wars of the Roses Blog’ on 4th March, 2013. Why is the date, 4th March, so significant in the Wars of the Roses?

 

 

 

 

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Henry’s Howlers: (1) Economic Background to the Wars of the Roses (1437-1450)

(1) Introduction: King Henry VI (1422-1461 and 1470-1471)

On 6th November 1429 in Westminster Abbey, Henry of Windsor (son and heir of King Henry V) was crowned King Henry VI of England.  This royal investiture in London was only the first half of a ‘double coronation’. Two years later, on 2nd December 1431, in Notre Dame Cathedral, Paris, Henry was also crowned King of France. Henry was then only four days short of his tenth birthday. About fourteen years after his French Coronation, on 23rd April 1445, Henry aspired to another Gallic royal triumph when he married Margaret of Anjou. Yet all this youthful promise was to come to nought:-

  • Within thirty years of his Paris coronation, in 1461, Henry VI had lost both his English and French Crowns. The Yorkist Edward Earl of March was crowned King Edward IV of England on 4th March 1461. Almost exactly four months later, on 3rd July 1461, Prince Louis of Valois was crowned King Louis XI of France.
  • Even worse was to follow. Within ten years of his English deposition, on 21st/22nd May 1471, King Henry VI was sadly  done to death in the Tower of London: almost certainly on the orders of King Edward IV. Henry was then about 50 years old.

So how is King Henry VI remembered today?

  • Is it that he is the youngest person ever to have succeeded to the English Crown? (Henry succeeded to the English Crown on 31st August 1422, when he was just nine months old.)
  • Is it that King Henry VI is the only King of England to be recognised as King of both England and France? (31st August 1422)
  • Is it that King Henry VI founded  both Eton College (in 1440) and King’s College, Cambridge (in 1441)?

For me, King Henry VI’s chief claim to fame is that, as Head of the Lancastrian Monarchy in England, he presided over one of the worst governments to rule in medieval England. Furthermore, so ineffective was King Henry VI, that he helped to cause the murderous conflict that was to engulf England in the mid-fifteenth century: The Wars of the Roses!

(2) Economic Recession 1440-1480

(i) Compared with the economic boom that occurred in 12th century England, the economic situation was very bleak in the mid-fifteenth century. Historians now refer to the mid-fifteenth century as ‘The Great Slump’. This economic downturn was especially severe for certain sections of English society:-

a) The Magnates (Great Nobility), who saw their rental income fall.

b) Woollen cloth manufacturers, who experienced a decline in woollen cloth exports.

c) Workers involved in manufacture, who were increasingly under-employed (or unemployed).

As is the case with most recessions, certain sectors of society did quite well, such as agricultural labourers.  John Hatcher and Mark Bailey have suggested that: “By the middle of the fifteenth century the purchasing power of a day’s labour seems to have more than doubled”.

[John Hatcher & Mark Bailey: ‘Modelling the Middle Ages’ (2001), page 48]

Yet overall, the recession was profound.

(ii) King Henry VI’s Lancastrian Government shared in this economic gloom. On 6th November 1449, a new session of Parliament met at the Dominican Friary, Ludgate, London. Immediately, the Commons  petitioned Henry VI on the state of royal finances. The petition is worth quoting in full:

“The Commons assembled in this your present parliament pray you to consider; whereas your chancellor of your realm of England, your treasurer of England, and many other lords of your council, by your high command, showed and declared the state of this your realm to your said commons at your parliament l; last held at Westminster; which was, that you were in debt for £372,000, which is a great and grievous sum.”

[‘The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275-1504, Volume XII’ (2012), page 107]

Worse then followed.  According to the Commons Petition, royal income was only £5,000 a year, while royal expenditure was £24,000 a year. Such financial pressures on governments are not restricted to the mid-fifteenth century: they are also only too apparent in 2013! The point is, such financial problems imposed severe constraints on Henry’s Government, which in turn was a great source of instability in mid-fifteenth century England (as the Commons Petition implied). In addition, financial pressures meant that the Lancastrian Government could not properly defend Normandy against the encroaching French Forces (see my forthcoming February Blog). The question is: How far were Henry VI and his ministers responsible for the financial mess in which they found themselves in 1450?

(3) To what extent was King Henry VI’s Lancastrian Government responsible for the Government  Financial Chaos in 1450?

On one level, Henry VI was simply the victim of the ‘Great Slump’. It has been estimated that English woollen cloth exports had collapsed by a third between 1440 and 1450. There had also been a decline in imports of wine in this period. This major contraction of international trade in turn meant a great reduction of crown revenue from customs duties. Royal revenue from the customs duties had been £40,000 in 1421 (towards the end of King Henry V’s reign).  In contrast, King Henry VI could only count on an average annual customs revenue of £28,000 between 1446 to 1448.

However, on another level, there is no doubt that the Lancastrian Government  made things worse for themselves, and Henry VI himself  should shoulder a lot of the responsibility:-

  • There is some evidence that Henry VI’s Government had got itself into a trade war with Burgundy (an independent Duchy in North Western Europe). This had led to Burgundy banning the import of English woollen cloth into Burgundy. Apparently, Henry’s Government had been feeble in its response to this prohibition. The Commons Petition in the Parliament that met at Westminster (February 1449) expressly complained that: “As yet no redress has been made, to the most intolerable harm of all the commons of this realm. . . many cloth makers, that is to say male weavers, fullers and dyers. And female combers, carders and spinners.” [‘The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275-1504, Volume XII’ (2012), page 60].
  • King Henry VI was excessively generous in making grants to supporters and for ‘good causes’. Right at the beginning of his rule, in 1438, one of Henry’s council clerks (in modern language, a top civil servant) had complained that Henry had pardoned a collector of customs, thereby losing the Crown £1,300. Exactly ten years later, in 1448, Henry VI expressly willed the huge yearly sum of £1,000 to go towards the building costs of King’s College, Cambridge. He even earmarked part of his own Duchy of Lancaster income to pay the £1,000. Needless to say, the money soon dried up. Such was Henry’s financial profligacy, that by 1450, his Government was reduced to mortgaging its future income to meet its current debts. The proceedings of the February 1449 Parliament also record a grant of 2,500 marks (about £1,700) to the Duke of Somerset and £1,000 to the Duke of Suffolk. [‘The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England Volume XII’, page 68] Both of these payments were to be paid from taxation revenue due to Henry VI’s Government in 1450.

(4) How did Economic Pressures contribute to the Outbreak of the Wars of the Roses?

One of the greatest 19th century philosophers of History, Karl Marx, pointed out the link between economic factors and political events. There is clearly some link between economic pressure and later political conflict. For example, no student of 20th century conflict would surely deny the links (direct or indirect) between the Wall Street Crash in the USA in 1929 and the later international conflicts in Manchuria (1931) and Abyssinia (1935).

Similarly, the ‘Great Slump’ of 1440 to 1480 was the clear backdrop to the murderous conflict between the Lancastrian and Yorkist Forces in England between 1455 and 1465.                                                                                              (i) Pressure on their rental incomes made the Magnates more disposed to use violence to protect their living standards. For example, a Lancastrian Force of 700 soldiers, led by Lord Egremont (son of the Earl of Northumberland) attacked a group of Yorkists at Heworth, outside York, in August 1453. This ‘battle’ was in effect the start of the Wars of the Roses; yet the real cause of the Lancastrian aggression was the fact that one member of the Yorkist group had  inherited two valuable manors (one in Yorkshire, one in Lincolnshire). Both these manors had originally belonged to the powerful Earls of Northumberland. This powerful Lancastrian family evidently wanted to regain these manors, probably to compensate for their declining rental income. (See my forthcoming April Blog for details).

(ii) The total Lancastrian mismanagement of the national finances was itself politically de-stabilising. It caused uncertainty and concern amongst the general population. Such concern could easily erupt into popular unrest, as actually happened in the summer of 1450 with the major civil strife in London known as Cade’s Rebellion. One of the complaints of the rioters in Cade’s Rebellion was that: “The King himself is so beset that he may not pay for his meat and drink, and he owes more than ever any King of England ought.” [‘English Historical Documents, Volume IV’, edited by A.R. Myers, page 267]

Nor could public opinion in 1450 fail to notice that the magnates who financially benefitted at a time of national stringency were the Dukes of Somerset and Suffolk. Both these Magnates were very close to King Henry.     Both these Lancastrian magnates were generally unpopular in 1450. The Duke of Suffolk was especially hated. According to the rioters in Cade’s Rebellion, he was: “the false traitor the Duke of Suffolk.” [English Historical Documents. Page 267]. Suffolk was effectively lynched by the mob in 1450. That left the Duke of Somerset to fly the Lancastrian Flag. Perhaps it was no accident that it was personal dislike of Somerset that fuelled the Duke of York’s opposition to the Lancastrian Government which was to be one of the bases of the Wars of the Roses a few years later.

(5) Conclusion

In his play King Henry VI, Part II (Act V, Scene I), Shakespeare has Richard Duke of York address Henry in the following way:-

“King did I call thee? No, thou art not a king,

Nor fit to govern and rule multitudes.”

Is York’s mocking speech justified?  Read the next exciting episode (February 2013) of my new ‘Wars of the Roses’ Blog, entitled: “Henry’s Howlers (2), ’Nonsense in Normandy and Mayhem in Maine.’

Question

King Henry VI is one of four medieval kings of England who were murdered after losing their throne. Who were the other three?

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Does History repeat itself? The English victories at Verneuil (Normandy): August 1173 and August 1424.

In the two hundred years or so following the Battle of Hastings, set-piece battles were actually rare in England and France. This may have been the result of a laudable desire of the competing protagonists to settle their differences by negotiation rather than conflict. In this sense, the period from 1066 to c.1266 stands out as an impressive epoch of peace and moderation in Western Europe, particularly in contrast to the first half of the 20th century.

Another, more likely, reason was that battles were themselves too much of a gamble for the rival commanders. All could be lost within a few hours. There are several examples of decisive major battles between 1066 and c.1266:-

  • The Battle of Stamford Bridge, 25th September 1066. The Anglo-Saxon victory saw the death of King Harald Hardrada of Norway, and marked the virtual end of serious Viking invasions of England – though there were later Viking incursions in 1069/1070 and 1102.
  • The Battle of Hastings, 14th October 1066. The Norman victory saw the death of King Harold of England, and the establishment of a new Cross-Channel State, and with it, the Anglo/Norman Dynasty.
  • The Battle of Tinchebrai, 28th September 1106. The victory of King Henry I of England saw the restoration of the Anglo-Norman State, and the effective elimination of Duke Robert as a serious threat to Normandy.
  • The Battle of Lincoln, 2nd February 1141. King Stephen’s defeat greatly revived the Angevin cause in their conflict with Stephen.
  • The Battle of Alnwick, 13th July 1174. William the Lion’s Scottish invasion of Northern England was repulsed by Northern English forces, thereby greatly helping King Henry II defeat the Great Revolt of 1173/1174.
  • The Battle of Bouvines, 27th July 1214. The defeat of King John’s Allies caused the final end of the Anglo/Norman state, and precipitated the events leading to Magna Carta.
  • The Battle of Evesham, 4th August 1265. The defeat of Simon de Montfort’s forces signalled the revival of King Henry III’s monarchy, and, with it, the succession of the future King Edward I.

The decisive nature of these battles can be partly gauged from the personal fate of the losing commanders. Three of them actually lost their lives in battle:-Harald Hardrada, Harold of England, and Simon de Montfort. Three others went into captivity as a result of their defeat in battle: Duke Robert, King Stephen, and King William the Lion. The seventh ‘defeated protagonist’, King John, was neither killed nor imprisoned as a result of Bouvines; but that was obviously because he was not actually present on the battlefield! Even so, the defeat of his allies at Bouvines led to John’s de facto coercion by his barons, leading to his concessions at Runnymede a year later.

What, then, of King Henry II’s success at Verneuil (August 1173)?

  • In 1173, King Henry II faced a major challenge to his authority. Three of his sons rebelled against him: Henry the Younger, Richard and Geoffrey. They were motivated by a desire for more authority within the Angevin Empire; and, up to a point, Henry II was possibly too rigid in denying them any power. These sons were joined by rebel barons in England, such as Hugh, Earl of Chester, and Hugh Bigod, Earl of Norfolk. This revolt in itself was a major threat to Henry II’s power; but what turned a serious revolt into a major challenge was the adherence of two foreign monarchies to the rebels’ banner: King Louis VII of France, and King William I of Scotland (The Lion). Both these two monarchs were motivated by sheer opportunism: the desire to profit by Henry II’s apparent weakness to gain territory for themselves. King Louis VII wanted to weaken the Angevin Empire by gaining Normandy. King William I wanted to regain northern English counties he had had to relinquish to Henry shortly after the latter’s accession to the English Crown. Philip, Count of Flanders, also threw in his lot with Henry’s opponents.
  • A lesser monarch than Henry II would perhaps have quailed under this combined assault; but Henry II was made of sterner stuff. He rallied his loyal forces to destroy this serious threat to his power. We have already seen how Henry’s northern sheriffs rose to the challenge by defeating King William I at Alnwick. What, then, of King Louis VII of France?
  • In May 1173, Henry’s enemies launched their invasion of Normandy. Philip, Count of Flanders invaded Normandy from the north-east. King Louis VII then invaded central Normandy from the south-east, targeting the fortress-town of Verneuil. Their combined invasion was a pincer movement on the great prize: Rouen, capital of Normandy. If Rouen fell, then Normandy would probably be lost to Henry. This in turn would greatly diminish his authority as King of England.
  • Philip’s northern invasion had seemed successful; but his brother, Matthew, Count of Boulogne, had been mortally wounded in their advance. Losing heart, Philip of Flanders withdrew from the invasion. Showing great military acumen, Henry now exploited his adversaries’ weakness by taking the offensive against the invading forces of King Louis VII of France. What happened next is best told by a contemporary chronicler, William of Newburgh, regarded by historians as a generally reliable writer.
  • Once Henry had heard of Count Philip’s abandonment of his invasion, Henry II: “concentrated his mercenary forces, together with as many others as felt bound not to desert him in his hour of extreme need, he sent a message to the king of France, who had already wasted the greater part of the summer in besieging Verneuil, to this effect: that he should either raise the siege or shrink not from fighting a decisive battle [my italics] on a certain day.” (‘English Historical Documents’, Volume II, page 373). Knowing the potentially disastrous consequences of fighting a decisive battle, King Henry II was either courageous or simply reckless – probably both. As it was, King Louis VII of France solved Henry’s military quandary by imitating his ally, the Count of Flanders, and abandoning the siege of Verneuil. Whatever Louis’ reasons, it was not an heroic act, nor even a pious one.
  • Although no battle was actually fought at Verneuil between the rival forces of Henry II and Louis VII, the withdrawal of the French forces must be counted as a great military success for Henry II. Normandy was safe, and on 11th August 1174, Henry II entered Rouen in triumph, accompanied by his welsh supporters. In consequence, Henry II’s authority was greatly strengthened. As no battle was fought, it is not possible to precisely date Henry’s military success at Verneuil. Even so, the date of 9th August 1173 is as good as any, because it was on that date when King Henry’s army ascended the hills overlooking Verneuil. They could see that the citadel was still in loyal hands, and they might also have even seen the retreat of Louis’ army, as Henry ordered his forces to harry Louis’ rearguard.

Postscript: Does History repeat itself?

  • Almost exactly 250 years after King Henry II’s great military success at Verneuil, English forces were again desperately defending their occupation of their territories in France, including Normandy. After King Henry V’s decisive military victory at Agincourt, in October 1415, England had regained control of Normandy, lost centuries before by King John.
  • After the sudden death of King Henry V in 1422, a combined Franco-Scottish Army took the offensive against the English forces in France (as in 1173).  A preliminary English victory, at Cravant in Burgundy, on 31st July 1423, eased the English position; but the decisive battle would very likely be fought in Normandy, the lynch-pin of English territory in France in the 1420s (as in the 1170s).
  • The decisive conflict was not long in coming. On 17th August 1424,at Verneuil in Normandy, a combined Anglo/Norman Army, about 8,000 strong, faced a combined Franco/Scottish Army possibly twice as strong. The Anglo/Norman Army, ably commanded by John, Duke of Bedford (the late King Henry V’s brother), destroyed the Franco/Scottish Army. Though Anglo/Norman losses were high, at around 1,600 men, they were dwarfed by the 6,000 losses sustained by the French and Scots, the latter losing both their leaders, the Earls of Buchan and Douglas. As already mentioned, pitched battles in the Middle Ages could involve death for the rival commanders.
  • Even so, King Henry II would have applauded the significance of the Anglo/Norman success in 1424. It guaranteed the English retention of Normandy for the next 25 years, and even then, Normandy was only lost to the French by the incompetence of Henry V’s heir, King Henry VI. In the same way, Henry II’s success at Vereuil in August 1173, guaranteed the Angevin retention of Normandy for thirty-one years, till 1204 (possibly also due to the incompetence of the reigning English king). Perhaps therefore, History really does repeat itself!

Two questions for all my Angevin supporters . . .

  1. Which famous 19th century German philosopher is often credited with coining the proverb, ‘History repeats itself,’ and what caveat did he add?
  2. What is the nickname of King Louis VII of France?

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